401 U.S. 222, *; 91 S. Ct. 643, **;
28 L. Ed. 2d 1, ***; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 75
HARRIS v. NEW YORK
No. 206
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
401 U.S. 222; 91 S. Ct. 643; 28 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1971 U.S. LEXIS 75
December 17, 1970, Argued
February 24, 1971, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
DISPOSITION: 25 N. Y. 2d 175, 250 N. E. 2d 349, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought review of an order from the Court
of Appeals of New York, which affirmed defendant's conviction for selling
heroin to an undercover police officer.
OVERVIEW: During cross-examination at his trial, defendant was
questioned regarding specified statements defendant made to the police
immediately following his arrest. The statements partially contradicted
defendant's direct testimony, and the state sought to impeach defendant with
his statements. However, the State made no effort to use the statements in its
case in chief, conceding that the statements were inadmissible under Miranda.
Defendant was subsequently convicted of selling heroin to an undercover police
officer, and the appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction. On appeal,
the court held that Miranda did not prevent the state from using defendant's
statement to the police to confront defendant with prior inconsistent
utterances. Thus, the court concluded that defendant's credibility was
appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed defendant's conviction for selling heroin
to a police officer.
CORE TERMS: credibility, impeachment, heroin, used to impeach, direct
testimony, inadmissible, narcotics, own defense, cross-examination, collateral,
possessed, harmless, tainted, impeach, indictment, bag, third person,
self-incrimination, confession, unfettered, complicity, police conduct, police
officer, impeached, constitutional dimension, opportunity to meet, illegally
obtained, evidence of guilt, crime charged, direct case
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes Hide
Headnotes
Criminal Law & Procedure > Interrogation > Miranda Rights
> Notice & Warning
Criminal Law & Procedure > Arrests > Miranda Warnings
Criminal Law & Procedure > Interrogation > Miranda Rights
> Voluntary Waiver
HN1 Miranda bars the prosecution from making its case with statements
of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving
counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an
accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided
of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal
standards. More Like This Headnote |
Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote
Criminal Law & Procedure > Trials > Defendant's Rights >
Right to Testify
HN2 Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to
include the right to commit perjury.
More Like This Headnote | Shepardize: Restrict By Headnote
Criminal Law & Procedure > Interrogation > Miranda Rights
> Custodial Interrogation
Criminal Law & Procedure > Witnesses > Impeachment
HN3 The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license
to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with
prior inconsistent utterances. A defendant's credibility can be appropriately
impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements. More Like This Headnote | Shepardize:
Restrict By Headnote
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SUMMARY: The accused, who was indicted for selling heroin and was tried
before a jury in the County Court of Westchester County, New York, had been
questioned by the police when taken into custody, but had not been warned of
his right to appointed counsel. After the accused testified at the trial, prior
inconsistent statements which he had made to the police were admitted in
evidence for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, and the jury was
instructed that such statements could be considered only in passing on the
accused's credibility, and not as evidence of guilt. The jury found the accused
guilty, and his conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second
Department (31 App Div 2d 828, 298 NYS2d 245), and by the New York Court of
Appeals (25 NY2d 175, 303 NYS2d 71, 250 NE2d 349).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. In an opinion
by Burger, Ch. J., expressing the view of five members of the court, it was
held that although the accused's prior inconsistent statements, which he did
not claim were coerced or involuntary, had been made to the police under
circumstances rendering them inadmissible to establish the prosecution's case
in chief under Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct
1602, 10 ALR3d 974, such statements could properly be used to impeach his
credibility, since the shield provided by the Miranda Case could not be
perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.
Black, J., dissented without opinion.
Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ., dissenting, stated
that it was monstrous that courts should aid lawbreaking police officers, and
that the court's decision in the instant case went far toward undoing much of
the progress made in conforming police methods to the Constitution.
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES:
[***LEdHN1]
WITNESSES §99
impeachment -- prior inconsistent statements --
Headnote: [1A]LEdHN(1A) [1B]LEdHN(1B)
Statements made by an accused to police under circumstances rendering the
statements inadmissible to establish the prosecution's case in chief under
Miranda v Arizona (1966) 384 US 436, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 86 S Ct 1602, 10 ALR3d
974, are admissible for purposes of impeaching the accused's credibility, where
(1) such statements are inconsistent with the accused's trial testimony bearing
directly on the crimes charged, and (2) although the police did not warn the
accused of his right to appointed counsel before they questioned him when he
was taken into custody, the accused makes no claim that his statements to the
police were coerced or involuntary.
[***LEdHN2]
WITNESSES §88
accused's privilege not to testify --
Headnote: [2]LEdHN(2)
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense,
or to refuse to do so, but this privilege does not include the right to commit
perjury.
[***LEdHN3]
WITNESSES §99
impeachment -- prior inconsistent statements --
Headnote: [3]LEdHN(3)
An accused who confesses fully to a homicide and leads the police to
the body of the victim under circumstances making his confession inadmissible
is not allowed to take the witness stand and blandly deny every fact disclosed
to the police or discovered as a fruit of his confession, free from
confrontation with his prior statements and acts.
SYLLABUS: Statement inadmissible against a defendant in the
prosecution's case in chief because of lack of the procedural safeguards
required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, may, if its trustworthiness
satisfies legal standards, be used for impeachment purposes to attack the
credibility of defendant's trial testimony. See Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62. Pp. 223-226.
COUNSEL: Joel Martin Aurnou argued the cause and filed a brief for
petitioner.
James J. Duggan argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief
was Carl A. Vergari.
Sybil H. Landau argued the cause for the District Attorney of New York
County as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Frank S.
Hogan, pro se, and Michael R. Juviler.
JUDGES: Burger, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Harlan, Stewart, White, and Blackmun, JJ., joined. Black, J., dissented.
Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Douglas and Marshall, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 226.
OPINIONBY: BURGER
OPINION: [*222] [***3]
[**644] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER
delivered the opinion of the Court.
[***LEdHR1A] [1A]LEdHR(1A)We granted the writ in this case
to consider petitioner's claim that a statement made by him to police under
circumstances rendering it inadmissible to establish the prosecution's case in
chief under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may not be used to impeach
his credibility.
The State of New York charged petitioner in a two-count indictment with
twice selling heroin to an undercover
[*223] police officer. At a
subsequent jury trial the officer was the State's chief witness, and he
testified as to details of the two sales. A second officer verified collateral
details of the sales, and a third offered testimony about the chemical analysis
of the heroin.
Petitioner took the stand in his own defense. He admitted knowing the
undercover police officer but denied a sale on January 4, 1966. He admitted
making a sale of contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but
claimed it was baking powder and part of a scheme to defraud the purchaser.
On cross-examination petitioner was asked seriatim whether he had made
specified statements to the police immediately following his arrest on January
7 -- statements that partially contradicted petitioner's direct testimony at
trial. In response to the cross-examination, petitioner testified that he could
not remember virtually any of the questions or answers recited by the
prosecutor. At the request of petitioner's counsel the written statement from
which the prosecutor had read questions and answers in his impeaching process
was placed in the record for possible use on appeal; the statement was not
shown to the jury.
The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to
petitioner by the prosecution could be considered only in passing on
petitioner's credibility and not as evidence of guilt. In closing summations
both counsel argued the substance of the impeaching statements. The jury then
found petitioner guilty on the second count of the indictment. n1 The New York
Court of [**645] Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion, 25
N. Y. 2d 175, 250 N. E. 2d 349 (1969).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 No agreement was reached as to the first count. That count was later
dropped by the State.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
At trial the prosecution made no effort in its case in chief to use the
statements allegedly made by petitioner,
[*224] conceding that they were
inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The transcript of
the interrogation used in the impeachment, but not given to the jury, shows
that no warning [***4] of a right to appointed counsel was given
before questions were put to petitioner when he was taken into custody.
Petitioner makes no claim that the statements made to the police were coerced
or involuntary.
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a
bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that
issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as
controlling. HN1Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with
statements of an accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively
waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible
against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all
purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies
legal standards.
In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), the Court permitted
physical evidence, inadmissible in the case in chief, to be used for impeachment
purposes.
"It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an
affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say
that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the
Government's possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself
with a shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an extension of the
Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the Fourth Amendment.
"There is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively
resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to
challenge his credibility." 347 U.S., at 65.
[*225] It is true that Walder was impeached as to
collateral matters included in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here
was impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes charged. We
are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a
result different from that reached by the Court in Walder. Petitioner's
testimony in his own behalf concerning the events of January 7 contrasted
sharply with what he told the police shortly after his arrest. The impeachment
process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing
petitioner's credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost,
in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police
conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a
deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when
the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in
chief.
[***LEdHR2] [2]LEdHR(2) [***LEdHR3] [3]LEdHR(3)HN2Every criminal defendant is
privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that
privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. See
United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969); cf. Dennis v. United States, 384
U.S. 855 (1966). Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no
more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary [**646]
process. n2 [***5] Had
[*226] inconsistent statements
been made by the accused to some third person, it could hardly be contended that
the conflict could not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination and
impeachment.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 If, for example, an accused confessed fully to a homicide and led
the police to the body of the victim under circumstances making his confession
inadmissible, the petitioner would have us allow that accused to take the stand
and blandly deny every fact disclosed to the police or discovered as a
"fruit" of his confession, free from confrontation with his prior
statements and acts. The voluntariness of the confession would, on this thesis,
be totally irrelevant. We reject such an extravagant extension of the
Constitution. Compare Killough v. United States, 114 U. S. App. D. C. 305, 315
F.2d 241 (1962).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***LEdHR1B] [1B]LEdHR(1B)HN3The shield provided by
Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense,
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. We
hold, therefore, that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by
use of his earlier conflicting statements.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents.
DISSENTBY: BRENNAN
DISSENT: MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
It is conceded that the question-and-answer statement used to impeach
petitioner's direct testimony was, under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), constitutionally inadmissible as part of the State's direct case
against petitioner. I think that the Constitution also denied the State the use
of the statement on cross-examination to impeach the credibility of
petitioner's testimony given in his own defense. The decision in Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), is not, as the Court today holds,
dispositive to the contrary. Rather, that case supports my conclusion.
The State's case against Harris depended upon the jury's belief of the
testimony of the undercover agent that petitioner "sold" the officer
heroin on January 4 and again on January 6. Petitioner took the stand and
flatly denied having sold anything to the officer on January 4. He countered
the officer's testimony as to the January 6 sale with testimony that he had
sold the officer two glassine bags containing what appeared to be heroin, but
that actually the bags contained only baking powder intended to deceive the
officer in order to obtain $ 12. [*227] The statement contradicted petitioner's
direct testimony as to the events of both days. The statement's version of the
events on January 4 was that the officer had used petitioner as a middleman to
buy some heroin from a third person with money furnished by the officer. The
version of the events on January 6 was that petitioner had again acted for the
officer in buying two bags of heroin from a third person for which petitioner
received $ 12 and a part of the heroin. Thus, it is clear that the statement
was used to impeach petitioner's direct testimony not on collateral matters but
on matters directly related to the crimes for which he was on trial. n1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 The trial transcript shows that petitioner testified that he remembered
making a statement on January 7; that he remembered a few of the questions and
answers; but that he did not "remember giving too many answers." When
asked about his bad memory, petitioner, who had testified that he was a heroin
addict, stated that "my joints was down and I needed drugs."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***6] Walder v. United States was not a case where
tainted evidence was used to impeach an accused's direct testimony on matters
directly related to the case against him. In Walder the evidence was used to
impeach the accused's testimony on matters collateral to the crime charged.
Walder had been indicted in 1950 for purchasing and possessing heroin. When his
motion to suppress use of the narcotics as illegally seized was granted, the
Government dismissed the prosecution.
[**647] Two years later Walder
was indicted for another narcotics violation completely unrelated to the 1950
one. Testifying in his own defense, he said on direct examination that he had
never in his life possessed narcotics. On cross-examination he denied that law
enforcement officers had seized narcotics from his home two years earlier. The
Government was then permitted to introduce the testimony of one of the officers
involved in the 1950 seizure, that when he had raided Walder's home at that
time he had seized narcotics there.
[*228] The Court held that on
facts where "the defendant went beyond a mere denial of complicity in the
crimes of which he was charged and made the sweeping claim that he had never
dealt in or possessed any narcotics," 347 U.S., at 65, the exclusionary
rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), would not extend to bar
the Government from rebutting this testimony with evidence, although tainted,
that petitioner had in fact possessed narcotics two years before. The Court was
careful, however, to distinguish the situation of an accused whose testimony,
as in the instant case, was a "denial of complicity in the crimes of which
he was charged," that is, where illegally obtained evidence was used to
impeach the accused's direct testimony on matters directly related to the case
against him. As to that situation, the Court said:
"Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to deny all the
elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government
to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore
not available for its case in chief." 347 U.S., at 65.
From this recital of facts it is clear that the evidence used for
impeachment in Walder was related to the earlier 1950 prosecution and had no
direct bearing on "the elements of the case" being tried in 1952. The
evidence tended solely to impeach the credibility of the defendant's direct
testimony that he had never in his life possessed heroin. But that evidence was
completely unrelated to the indictment on trial and did not in any way
interfere with his freedom to deny all elements of that case against him. In
contrast, here, the evidence used for impeachment, a statement concerning the
details of the very sales alleged in the indictment, was directly related to
the case against petitioner.
[*229] While Walder did not identify the
constitutional specifics that guarantee "a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him . . . [and permit him to] be
free to deny all the elements [***7] of the case against him," in my view
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), identified the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination as one of those specifics. n2 [*230]
That [**648] privilege has been extended against the
States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). It is fulfilled only when an
accused is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," id., at 8 (emphasis
added). The choice of whether to testify in one's own defense must therefore be
"unfettered," since that choice is an exercise of the constitutional
privilege, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Griffin held that
comment by the prosecution upon the accused's failure to take the stand or a
court instruction that such silence is evidence of guilt is impermissible because
it "fetters" that choice -- "it cuts down on the privilege by
making its assertion costly." Id., at 614. For precisely the same reason
the constitutional guarantee forbids the prosecution to use a tainted statement
to impeach the accused who takes the stand: The prosecution's use of the
tainted statement "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly." Ibid. Thus, the accused is denied an "unfettered"
choice when the decision whether to take the stand is burdened by the risk that
an illegally obtained prior statement may be introduced to impeach his direct
testimony denying complicity in the crime charged against him. n3 We settled
this proposition in Miranda where we said:
" [***8] The privilege
against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner . . . . Statements merely intended to be
exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial .
. . . These statements are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word
and may not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required
for [*231] any other statement." 384 U.S., at
476-477 (emphasis added).
This language completely disposes of any distinction between statements
used on direct as opposed to cross-examination. n4 " [**649] An incriminating statement is as
incriminating when used to impeach credibility as it is when used as direct
proof of guilt and no constitutional distinction can legitimately be
drawn." People v. Kulis, 18 N. Y. 2d 318, 324, 221 N. E. 2d 541, 543
(1966) (dissenting opinion).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Three of the five judges of the Appellate Division in this case
agreed that the State's use of petitioner's illegally obtained statement was an
error of constitutional dimension. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298
N. Y. S. 2d 245 (1969). However, one of the three held that the error did not
play a meaningful role in the case and was therefore harmless under our
decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). He therefore joined in
affirming the conviction with the two judges who were of the view that there
was no constitutional question involved. 31 App. Div. 2d, at 830, 298 N. Y. S.
2d, at 249. I disagree that the error was harmless and subscribe to the
reasoning of the dissenting judges, id., at 831-832, 298 N. Y. S. 2d at 250:
"Under the circumstances outlined above, I cannot agree that this
error of constitutional dimension was 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' (
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24). An error is not harmless if 'there is
a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed
to the conviction' ( Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87). The burden of
showing that a constitutional error is harmless rests with the People who, in
this case, have not even attempted to assume that demonstration ( Chapman v.
California, supra). Surely it cannot be said with any certainty that the
improper use of defendant's statement did not tip the scales against him,
especially when his conviction rests on the testimony of the same undercover
agent whose testimony was apparently less than convincing on the January 4
charge (cf. Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 525). On the contrary, it is
difficult to see how defendant could not have been damaged severely by use of
the inconsistent statement in a case which, in the final analysis, pitted his word
against the officer's. The judgment should be reversed and a new trial
granted."
The Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam on the authority of its
earlier opinion in People v. Kulis, 18 N. Y. 2d 318, 221 N. E. 2d 541 (1966).
Chief Judge Fuld and Judge Keating dissented in Kulis on the ground that
Miranda precluded use of the statement for impeachment purposes, 18 N. Y. 2d,
at 323, 221 N. E. 2d, at 542.
n3 It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider petitioner's argument
that Miranda has overruled the narrow exception of Walder admitting impeaching
evidence on collateral matters.
n4 Six federal courts of appeals and appellate courts of 14 States have
reached the same result. United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (CA2 1968); United
States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (CA3 1968); Breedlove v. Beto, 404 F.2d 1019 (CA5
1968); Groshart v. United States, 392 F.2d 172 (CA9 1968); Blair v. United
States, 130 U. S. App. D. C. 322, 401 F.2d 387 (1968); Wheeler v. United
States, 382 F.2d 998 (CA10 1967); People v. Barry, 237 Cal. App. 2d 154, 46
Cal. Rptr. 727 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967); Velarde v. People,
171 Colo. 261, 466 P. 2d 919 (1970); State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla.
1968); People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N. E. 2d 586 (1967); Franklin v.
State, 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A. 2d 487 (1969); People v. Wilson, 20 Mich. App.
410, 174 N. W. 2d 79 (1969); State v. Turnbow, 67 N. M. 241, 354 P. 2d 533
(1960); State v. Catrett, 276 N. C. 86, 171 S. E. 2d 398 (1970); State v.
Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P. 2d 581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A. 2d 209 (1968); Spann v. State, 448
S. W. 2d 128 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 164
S. E. 2d 699 (1968); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N. W. 2d 370
(1967); see also Kelly v. King, 196 So. 2d 525 (Miss. 1967). Only three state
appellate courts have agreed with New York. State v. Kimbrough, 109 N. J.
Super. 57, 262 A. 2d 232 (1970); State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N. E. 2d
818 (1969); State v. Grant, 77 Wash. 2d 47, 459 P. 2d 639 (1969).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The objective of deterring improper police conduct is only part of the
larger objective of safeguarding the integrity of our adversary system. The
"essential mainstay" of that system, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at
460, is the privilege against self-incrimination, which for [*232]
that reason has occupied a central place in our jurisprudence since
before the Nation's birth. Moreover, "we may view the historical
development of the privilege as one which groped for the proper scope of
governmental power over the citizen. . . . All these policies point to one
overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is
the respect a government . . . must accord to the dignity and integrity of its
citizens." Ibid. These values are plainly jeopardized if an exception
against admission of tainted statements is made for those used for impeachment
purposes. Moreover, it is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the
law-breaking police officer. It is abiding truth that "nothing can destroy
a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse,
its disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 659 (1961). [***9] Thus, even to the extent that Miranda was
aimed at deterring police practices in disregard of the Constitution, I fear that
today's holding will seriously undermine the achievement of that objective. The
Court today tells the police that they may freely interrogate an accused
incommunicado and without counsel and know that although any statement they
obtain in violation of Miranda cannot be used on the State's direct case, it
may be introduced if the defendant has the temerity to testify in his own
defense. This goes far toward undoing much of the progress made in conforming
police methods to the Constitution. I dissent.
REFERENCES: Return To Full Text
Opinion
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence 555-557, 614; Am Jur 2d, Witnesses (1st ed 688,
733)
19 Am Jur Proof of Facts 1, Waiver of Rights Under the Miranda Decision
5 Am Jur Trials 331, Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence 32
US L Ed Digest, Witnesses 99
ALR Digests, Witnesses 98
L Ed Index to Anno, Criminal Law; Evidence; Witnesses
ALR Quick Index, Impeachment of Witnesses; Miranda v Arizona
Federal Quick Index, Impeachment of Witnesses; Miranda v Arizona
Annotation References:
Admissibility of pretrial confession in criminal cases. 1 L Ed 2d 1735,
4 L Ed 2d 1833, 12 L Ed 2d 1340, 16 L Ed 2d 1294, 22 L Ed 2d 872.
Accused's right to counsel under the Federal Constitution. 93 L Ed 137,
2 L Ed 2d 1644, 9 L Ed 2d 1260, 18 L Ed 2d 1420.
Necessity of informing suspect of rights under privilege against
self-incrimination, prior to police interrogation. 10 ALR3d 1054.
Impeachment of accused as witness by use of involuntary or not properly
qualified confession. 89 ALR2d 478.